Can An Employer Fire Employees Who Refuse To Come Back to the Office?

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By Kathleen J. Jennings (kjj@wimlaw.com)

As COVID restrictions ease, many employers are deciding whether to require employees who have been working remotely to come back to the office. So can an employer fire employees who refuse to come back to the office? Yes–with some important exceptions.

Let’s face it, we have learned over the past year that remote work has some advantages. No commute, no need to dress up and put on makeup very day (unless there is a Zoom meeting), no uncomfortable shoes, and you can fix your own pretty inexpensive lunch. And that super-chatty co-worker can’t stop by and take up your time with another story about his cats. But there are disadvantages as well. It’s hard to have a consistent corporate culture when employees are not in the same place. Employees may not feel connected to their co-workers because they don’t have the water cooler or break room conversations. Mental health issues have arisen for people who have felt lonely or isolated during remote work. And we cannot underestimate the value of face-time in furthering career advancement. The bottom line: some people thrive in a remote work setting, and some people don’t. Some people simply prefer to be in an office setting with co-workers.

If an employer decides that it wants employees back in the office, it can generally terminate employees who refuse to give up their remote work lifestyles; it is insubordination for an employee to refuse a reasonable directive of her/his employer. However, and this is a big however, if an employer is covered by the Americans With Disabilities Act, it may need to consider whether allowing a disabled employee to continue to work remotely is considered a reasonable accommodation. For example, in Massachusetts, a worker with asthma sued their employer regarding a work from home accommodation, and the federal district court allowed the case to go forward.

The success of remote work in the past year or so will make it more difficult for an employer to convince a court that working remotely is not a “reasonable” accommodation or that working at a particular location is an “essential function” of the job. It’s a good idea to consult an attorney in this situation.

Just because you CAN do something does not mean that you must do it. There are going to be some folks who feel so strongly about working remotely that they are willing to quit rather than return to the office. Or maybe they still don’t have reliable child care. Is it worth losing employees, especially valuable employees, over this issue? How easily will you be able to replace them?

And finally–if you want to avoid claims for discrimination on the basis of characteristics other than disability, you’d better have some valid, non-discriminatory reasons for allowing some employees to work remotely while others are required to go into the office. Don’t play favorites.

Kathleen J. Jennings is an attorney licensed to practice law in Georgia and New York. She graduated from Cornell University, College of Arts & Sciences, with distinction and New York University School of Law. She is a principal in the Atlanta office of Wimberly, Lawson, Steckel, Schneider, & Stine, P.C. and defends employers in employment matters, such as sexual harassment, discrimination, Wage and Hour, OSHA, restrictive covenants, and other employment litigation and provides training and counseling to employers in employment matters. She can be contacted at kjj@wimlaw.com.

Copyright 2021 Kathleen Jennings

The materials available at this blog site are for informational purposes only and not for the purpose of providing legal advice. You should contact your attorney to obtain advice with respect to any particular issue or problem. Use of and access to this Web site or any of the e-mail links contained within the site do not create an attorney-client relationship between Kathleen J. Jennings and the user or browser. The opinions expressed at or through this site are the opinions of the individual author.

Religious Liberty vs. LBGTQ Rights: Narrow Supreme Court Decision Fails to Resolve Many Questions

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By Kathleen J. Jennings (kjj@wimlaw.com)

One of the most eagerly anticipated decisions coming from the U.S. Supreme Court this term was Fulton v. Philadephia, a case involving a Catholic charity’s challenge to a Philadelphia ordinance that excluded it from part of the city’s foster-care program because the charity would not help place children with same-sex couples. The charity argued that the ordinance violated its First Amendment right to religious freedom, and the U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, agreed. However, the Court’s decision focused very narrowly on the ordinance at issue and did not address the bigger question of what happens when religious liberty and anti-bias laws collide. Thus, it is likely that we will see more litigation on these issues.

What does this decision mean for employers? Not a heck of a lot–yet. Last year, the Supreme Court ruled that Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and sexual identity. But that case did not answer any questions about the possibility of religious defenses to discrimination against LBGTQ employees and applicants. The ultimate question is this: Is there a Constitutional right to discriminate that would override Title VII in some context? 

Certain employers can invoke the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to defend against discrimination lawsuits brought by the government. Religious organizations, such as churches and religious schools, are permitted to give employment preference to members of their own religion under a Title VII exception. Religious groups are likely to continue pushing the boundaries of religious freedom. Whether that push will infringe upon the hard-won rights of LGBTQ people to be free from discrimination remains to be seen.

Kathleen J. Jennings is an attorney licensed to practice law in Georgia and New York. She graduated from Cornell University, College of Arts & Sciences, with distinction and New York University School of Law. She is a principal in the Atlanta office of Wimberly, Lawson, Steckel, Schneider, & Stine, P.C. and defends employers in employment matters, such as sexual harassment, discrimination, Wage and Hour, OSHA, restrictive covenants, and other employment litigation and provides training and counseling to employers in employment matters. She can be contacted at kjj@wimlaw.com.

Copyright 2021 Kathleen Jennings

The materials available at this blog site are for informational purposes only and not for the purpose of providing legal advice. You should contact your attorney to obtain advice with respect to any particular issue or problem. Use of and access to this Web site or any of the e-mail links contained within the site do not create an attorney-client relationship between Kathleen J. Jennings and the user or browser. The opinions expressed at or through this site are the opinions of the individual author.